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The Other Academic Dishonesty: Why Grade Inflation is Ethically Wrong
David Collins

Abstract: While there is general agreement among educators that grade inflation
is wrong, there are few discussions in the existing literature of the way in which it
is wrong or what makes it wrong, and fewer attempts to approach its wrongness
through moral philosophy. I argue that grade inflation—understood as an
evaluation of a student’s work or performance that reports its quality as higher
than it is—counts as ethically wrong on the three most widely accepted normative
ethical theories, and that as such it should be considered ethically wrong
simpliciter. I consider three objections to my argument and show them to be
mistaken, and conclude by suggesting one way for educators to resist inflating
grades in contexts that encourage such inflation.
Bio: David Collins is a doctoral candidate in philosophy at McGill University
where he is currently completing a dissertation on R.G. Collingwood’s philosophy
of art. In addition to aesthetics, he has research interests in moral philosophy,
American Pragmatism, philosophical psychology, and philosophy of education.
He comes to philosophy from a background studying, creating, and teaching film.
Keywords: grade inflation; grading; academic dishonesty; applied ethics;
philosophy of education; professional responsibility
Introduction
Educators are likely to agree that grade inflation is wrong, yet evidence suggests it is also
commonly practiced throughout secondary and post-secondary education, at least in North
America. As a representative statistic, Catherine Rampell reports that 43% of grades at U.S.
colleges and universities in 2011 were A or A-minus, whereas these comprised 31% of grades in
1988 and only 15% in 1960.1 As for personal or anecdotal evidence, I trust those with teaching
experience will have witnessed instances of grade inflation directly or heard of instances through
colleagues. As for my own experience, I was a sessional instructor at an Ontario college from
2004 to 2011. During this time I noticed many colleagues making assignments and tests easier by
requiring less while lowering expectations for what counted as meeting these requirements,
ignoring a widespread lack of literacy and—based on what many students showed me of their
work for other courses—giving A’s or B-pluses to mediocre or incompetent work.
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In 2011, prior to leaving this teaching job to pursue a second MA and a PhD in philosophy,
one of my students expressed her frustration with what she saw of her peers’ work and their
instructors’ assessments of them in a letter to the college’s president. Her observations from a
student’s perspective exactly mirrored my own. From what she saw,
students were, in the majority, given A’s on assignments without following the
assignment’s requirements. [She] witnessed numerous times students
complaining about receiving a B or less when the assignment, in [her] opinion,
did not follow instructions, was hard to understand/read, and was admittedly
thrown together the night before.
Concerning literacy, she reports that
marking level[s] and assignments rarely reflected/required the basic use of
proper English grammar and sentence structure. [She] often read classmates’
work and did not understand how a professor was able to assign a mark when
the written portion of the assignment was missing the most BASIC [sic] level
of literacy and competency.
In relation to the difficulty and rigour of assigned work, she writes that many of her assignments
were more appropriately designed for a high school level student.
[E]xaminations … did not require students to have comprehended the
material, and often professors did everything in their power to ensure students
received high marks (giving away answers, very easy multiple choice, etc.).2
Assuming this is not isolated to one college during one decade but is fairly widespread, does it
mean that educators are deceiving themselves with respect to their own grading practices when
they publicly opine against grade inflation? Do some experience cognitive dissonance, like the
teacher quoted by Ilana Finefter-Rosenbluh and Meira Levinson, who says: “How do [teachers]
live with themselves? We just take part in this thing… Am I a partner in crime…a full
contributor [to] grade inflation”?3 Or do teachers inflate grades as a lesser of two evils, thinking
it wrong but justifying it by other factors?
While largely acknowledging that grade inflation is wrong, little attention is paid in the
current literature to precisely how or why it is wrong. A few have raised this question,4 but no
one seems to have approached it substantially from the perspective of applied ethics or in terms
of a normative theory specifying grounds for judging when, and why, actions or practices are
wrong. Finefter-Rosenbluh and Levinson come closest, looking at possible motivations for grade
inflation through the lens of care ethics, but admit to “offer[ing] no definitive conclusion … to
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the question of ‘what is wrong with grade inflation (if anything)?’.”5 This leaves a gap in the
literature that this paper is intended to fill.
I begin my paper by giving a working definition of grade inflation and then argue that grade
inflation, so defined, is unethical. To avoid tying my argument to a single ethical theory or
normative framework, I propose the following principle: If X counts as ethically wrong on the
criteria of several philosophically respectable normative ethical theories,6 then, unless another
ethical theory is more likely to be correct than the aforementioned theories (and barring ethical
nihilism), X really is prima facie ethically wrong. In accord with this principle (which we can
call the Principle of Theory Convergence), I give arguments for why grade inflation counts as
ethically wrong on the three most currently prominent normative ethical theories: deontology,
consequentialism, and virtue ethics. The discussion in these sections will be somewhat cursory
from necessity; while much more could be said about why grade inflation counts as wrong on
each theory, and more nuance accorded to each theory than I have space for, I aim only to
demonstrate that grade inflation is ethically wrong on all three theories. I then consider potential
objections and show why these objections fail, concluding that grade inflation really is prima
facie ethically wrong. I end with a brief consideration of what, practically, can be done to resist
inflating grades by teachers working in conditions that might implicitly encourage it.

Defining Grade Inflation
Existing definitions of grade inflation, such as “an increasing proportion of excellent grades
scored…without evidence of a concurrent increase in … actual performance” 7 or “attainment of
higher grades independent of increased levels of academic attainment”, 8 define it in terms of a
comparison between one set of students and another, or between one student’s grades at different
times. This is not surprising as most discussions of the phenomenon conceive of it in terms of
statistical patterns, typically an increase in higher grades over time, as seen in the statistics from
Rampell above. However, while such patterns might indicate that grade inflation occurs, defining
grade inflation in these terms restricts it to being a macro-phenomenon—a pattern of grade
distribution over time—rather than an action that an educator can take. This might be thought to
explain why there have been so few discussions of grade inflation as ethically wrong.
I contend that any definition of grade inflation should focus on actions rather than statistical
trends. Acts of assigning grades are logically and temporally prior to grade averages, so grade
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inflation cannot primarily be a difference between averages but must relate to that of which they
are averages. Moreover, if grade inflation is something that can be ethically wrong it should be
conceived as an action rather than an object—i.e., the act of assigning a grade, rather than the
grade(s) assigned. There is nothing unethical about the average GPA being higher at one time
than another or among one group compared with another, as long as this corresponds to a
difference in quality of performance across times or between groups. Intuitively, what is wrong
is for grades not to match the level of achievement they purport to measure. It is just as
intuitively wrong for averages to remain the same over time if the quality of students’ work
decreases, but standard definitions cannot account for this. I propose that grade inflation be
defined as follows: an evaluator assessing a student’s work (product or performance) where this
assessment, according to the conventions by which it is governed, characterizes the work’s
quality as better than it is.9
The conventions according to which assessment is governed might include a rubric or list of
qualitative descriptions associated with certain grades, or outcomes that need to be met to pass or
earn a credit. The actual versus the reported quality of work can be determined by comparing
what students have done with what an assignment’s instructions required them to do, the learning
outcomes for the course, etc., including standards of minimally literate writing where
appropriate. When assignment instructions are not followed or outcomes are not met, awarding a
student even a low passing grade in a course will count as grade inflation on the above definition,
since granting a credit certifies that the student has actually learned or done what was expected in
that course to a basic degree.
This makes grade inflation distinct from grade compression, which involves a change over
time in the meanings conventionally associated with grades such that grades at the higher end of
the scale come to be associated with a lower level of quality than previously, e.g. giving A’s to
work that is good but not outstanding. While this has negative consequences, such as making it
less possible to distinguish between different degrees of good work leading to a decreased ability
to indicate improvement—as long as assigned grades honestly report the quality of a student’s
work according to these compressed standards, it is not clear that anything is ethically wrong.
However, as I show below, there is something ethically wrong with grade inflation as defined
above—where the inability of statistical trends commonly offered as evidence of grade inflation
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to distinguish between inflation and compression gives a further reason not to define grade
inflation in terms of statistics.

Why Grade Inflation is Wrong: Deontology
Many forms of deontology have their basis in Kant’s ethics, the central principle of which—
the categorical imperative—is given in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals in two
formulations. The first involves the universalizability of the maxim or principle on which one
acts, holding that one should “act only according to that maxim through which you can at the
same time will that it become a universal law.”10 Since grade inflation involves misrepresenting
the quality of a student’s work or performance, it is dishonest and so faces the same problems as
do other cases of deception. In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes that the “communication
of one’s thoughts to someone through words that yet (intentionally) contain the contrary of what
the speaker thinks on the subject is an end that is directly opposed to the natural purposiveness of
the speaker’s capacity to communicate his thoughts.”11 Communicating necessarily involves
willing that others believe you, where one cannot will this and will universally the maxim,
‘people should say whatever is convenient, whether or not they believe it to be true,’ since the
end of communication would become impossible to attain. If everyone were to act on this
maxim, no one would believe others and so communication could no longer serve its purpose.12
Similarly, assigning a grade that communicates to a student or another (admissions officer,
scholarship committee, etc.) that the student has understood or accomplished more than she has
goes against the function of grading, which is to report the quality of work done so that interested
parties can use this information for various purposes, whether this is the student knowing what to
keep doing, what to change, how to improve in future work, an admissions officer or selection
committee knowing which candidates meet their criteria, etc. Since the various functions of
grades all presuppose the effectiveness of this reporting,13 one cannot consistently assign a grade
and will universally the maxim ‘one should assign a grade that characterizes work as being better
than it is.’ If everyone were to act on this maxim, grading as a practice would be undermined
since no one would believe that a high grade correlated with high quality work. Thus, inflating
grades violates the categorical imperative and so, for Kant, is impermissible.
As well as contravening the first formulation of the categorical imperative, grade inflation
violates Kant’s second formulation, the Formula of Humanity. This holds that one should always
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“act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of any other, always at
the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”14 Inflating a student’s grades involves
treating the student as a means if done to avoid dealing with complaints or to have the student
view one more favourably, especially with the hope of receiving higher teaching evaluations. 15 It
might be objected that inflating grades for non-self-interested motives such as boosting
confidence or increasing chances of admission to good schools will not violate the formula of
humanity, or that even with self-interested motives it will not do so because it promotes students’
ends by giving them something they value, and so does not treat them merely as means.
However, this objection fails. If high grades are valuable because of benefits to students such as
scholarships or admission to good programs, inflating them still involves treating someone as a
means contrary to that person’s ends—viz. those awarding the scholarship or selecting applicants
for admission, so it violates the formula of humanity. Moreover, it makes the student (perhaps
unknowingly) complicit in the deception insofar as she will be the one to use the inflated grades
to gain the benefits in question, where this surely violates a duty not to implicate others in
unethical behaviour.
Since grade inflation violates both formulations of the categorical imperative, it clearly counts
as ethically wrong for Kant. While I have focused on Kantian deontology, similar considerations
will apply to other deontic approaches such as W.D. Ross’ plurality of prima facie16 duties. Ross
also posits a prima facie duty of veracity based on a promise not to lie being implicit in
conversation,17 and takes lying as “prima facie to do a positive injury to another person.”18
Moreover, grade inflation involves what Sarah Stroud’s ‘quasi-Rossian’ account of lying calls a
“relationship of infidelity,”19 since the person grading, qua educator, occupies a position of
authority with respect to the academic subject-matter. Legitimately assigning grades must be
done in one’s capacity as a credible source of knowledge about the quality of the work or the
student’s performance. Assigning a grade involves assuming responsibility both for the accuracy
and trustworthiness of what it communicates and for one’s competence to judge what is being
graded. Assigning a grade that misrepresents what it communicates violates this responsibility.20
Since it is hard to see how any plausible system of deontic ethics would not involve at least a
prima facie duty of honesty or fidelity, then, in the absence of any overriding factors, grade
inflation should be taken to count as wrong on deontic ethical theories.
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Why Grade Inflation is Wrong: Consequentialism
Both act- and rule-based varieties of consequentialism tie rightness and wrongness to the net
benefits or harms of the outcomes to which a given action (act-consequentialism), or a general
rule to perform a type of action, if widely followed (rule-consequentialism), will lead. A rule
consequentialist approach to grade inflation will consider some of the same factors as the
deontological argument above, especially the potential for the positive function of grading to be
undermined by widespread grade inflation.21 While rule consequentialists and deontologists are
both concerned with rules for acting, the former take the consequences of acting on these rules to
be what holds moral weight, not the logical consistency between the rules’ maxims and practical
willing.
Unlike lying in general, where it is implausible that individual lies can damage the institution
of communication itself,22 evidence suggests the function of grading actually is being
undermined by grade inflation. One example comes from McGill University in Quebec, which in
response to reports of rampant grade inflation in Ontario in recent years has reportedly begun
deflating grades of applicants from Ontario high schools by five percent to compensate for
possible unfair advantages they might have over applicants from other jurisdictions.23 While I
would argue that making this sort of judgment of individual students’ grades on the basis of a
statistical generalization, and without any acquaintance with the students’ work, is itself ethically
questionable, it illustrates how the practice of grading and its functions actually can be
undermined: if grade inflation is known or reasonably believed to be common, there is no way to
determine whether a particular applicant’s grades are accurate short of assessing each applicant’s
work directly, and so there is no clear way to counteract possible unfairness that is not itself
unfair (or unreasonably time-consuming).
Evidence of such effects will be among the negative outcomes a consequentialist will
consider, with their actual occurrence holding more weight than the mere potential for other
beneficial outcomes. A rule consequentialist will also count other possible effects of grades no
longer being reliable indicators of ability or achievement, such as the perpetuation of social or
economic injustices that can occur when admission and scholarship committees no longer have a
reliable merit-based criterion and are left with the reputation of a school or letter writers, which
favours students who are already well-off.24 It is unclear what long-term benefits could accrue
from grade inflation being widely practiced that might outweigh these actual and potential
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harms, so it is unlikely that rule consequentialism will condone grade inflation when all relevant
factors are considered.
Act consequentialism counts specific actions as right so long as their outcomes are more
positive than negative overall, and in principle will hold that any one instance of inflating a grade
is justified if it has better consequences than assigning a lower grade in that case. I suspect
teachers who inflate grades often rationalize their choice by assuming students will benefit
enough to justify the dishonesty of this false report. Benefits might be thought to include
pleasure at receiving praise, increased self-confidence, and the promotion of a positive attitude
towards education, whereas low grades might be thought to lower self-esteem and discourage or
disengage students from learning. However, even if these consequences follow in a given case,
they are short-term and must be weighed against additional long-term consequences such as
becoming habituated to assess one’s strengths and weaknesses inaccurately, not learning how to
deal emotionally with failure, being less able to recognize and learn from mistakes due to not
being told where and how one can improve (where this limits the ability to learn), and becoming
disengaged in the long run due to a lack of challenges and incentives to learn more than one
already knows or can do.25 Other large-scale outcomes that might follow include negative
economic effects due to a less-competent workforce, decreased levels of civic and political
awareness, and lower levels of critical thinking and abilities to filter and understand
information.26
Not only do these drawbacks outweigh any short-term positive consequences, but effects such
as the short-term promotion of a student’s self-esteem are themselves contributing factors for
negative long-term consequences, since what results from being told one’s abilities are greater
than they are is false self-esteem, insofar as it rests on a false conception of oneself. Shielding
students at earlier stages from dealing with temporary setbacks and failures when these are likely
to be less serious sets them up to be affected more negatively by failure at later stages where
more is likely to be at stake, including their (inauthentic) senses of self.27 Thus, not only are the
supposed short-term benefits outweighed by plausible long-term negative consequences, they
make certain negative consequences more likely to occur, further undermining their beneficial
status.
More tangible benefits for students that might result from grade inflation include getting into
a good university or graduate school, earning a credit needed to get a degree or a degree needed
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to get a good job, winning awards, etc. However, these benefits are likely to be short-lived since
being passed on to a higher level of school, or graduating with a degree that certifies certain
abilities and achievements without having the skills and knowledge to operate at these higher
levels or in certain jobs, will create difficulties overall. Just as being given a higher belt in karate
than one’s skill merits and advancing to the next class can result in getting beaten, being passed
to a higher level of schooling when one is not sufficiently prepared will almost certainly result in
an intellectual and emotional ‘beating,’ and so does the student no real favours in the long run.
So, most positive outcomes that might be thought to justify grade inflation in particular cases,
almost certainly will be outweighed by greater negative outcomes, and moreover may contain the
seeds of their own destruction by helping to pave the way for these longer-term negative
consequences, where these are not likely to be counterbalanced by any further long-term
benefits. Thus, for both rule and act consequentialism, grade inflation will count as unethical on
most, if not all, ‘cost-benefit analyses.’

Why Grade Inflation is Wrong: Virtue Ethics
Unlike deontology and consequentialism, which focus primarily on the goodness or rightness
of acts, virtue ethics focuses on an agent’s character and defines right action derivatively, if at
all. As Rosalind Hursthouse formulates it, for virtue ethicists “[a]n action is right [if and only if]
it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e., acting in character) do in the
circumstances,”28 where “[a] virtuous agent is one who has, and exercises, certain character
traits, namely, the virtues” and where virtues are “character trait[s] a human being needs for
eudaimonia, to flourish or live well.”29 This risks circularity if not supplemented by a substantive
account of what a virtue is, such as Aristotle’s characterization in Nicomachean Ethics of a virtue
as “a characteristic involving choice, [which] consists in observing [a] mean relative to us, a
mean which is defined by a rational principle, such as a man of practical wisdom would use to
determine it.”30 A virtue, in other words, is a reliable disposition (i) to value, and so aim at, what
is most appropriate to do in a situation—a ‘mean’ between what would be excessive or deficient
to do in that situation—and (ii) to characteristically succeed in hitting this ‘mean’. Among
virtues are typically included dispositions to act justly rather than unjustly, temperately rather
than self-indulgently or self-abasingly, generously rather than stingily or extravagantly,
courageously rather than cowardly or recklessly, and, importantly, to be truthful rather than to
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exaggerate or downplay that of which one speaks.31 On this approach, whether grade inflation is
wrong is a matter of whether it would be in character for a virtuous person to inflate a student’s
grade, which is a question of whether doing so is best characterized in terms of virtue or vice
terms—would it be just or unjust, generous or extravagant, courageous or cowardly, honest, etc.?
Grade inflation as explained above is clearly dishonest, and can manifest other vices
depending on the reasons why it is done. For example, if it is done from a desire to avoid dealing
with student complaints about grades or pressure from administrators about class averages, it will
manifest cowardice insofar as giving low but honest grades in the face of pressures takes
courage. Not inflating grades also requires temperance to risk receiving low evaluations and
foregoing the pleasure associated with receiving praise and professional rewards. As Aristotle
notes, a virtuous person does not only want to be honoured, but to be honoured for the right
reasons and by the right people, i.e., those qualified to judge her worth and disposed to do so
honestly and fairly.32
This last point has implications for students and their attitudes towards grades. It would be a
comparable virtue of a student to want high grades only when these are earned for the right
reasons and based on accurate judgments of their achievements. Since one effect of widespread
grade inflation is students coming to expect high grades for whatever they submit, or to expect
them for the wrong reasons, e.g., for effort, or the fact that they enjoyed or attended the class,33
and since this counts as wanting to be honoured for the wrong reasons, grade inflation could be
said to encourage the formation of a vice in students. A virtuous educator will aim at further
developing her students’ characters qua learners as well as increasing their knowledge and so
will avoid inflating grades, not wanting to habituate students to prefer dishonesty, false honours,
and inauthentic pleasures.
If one inflates grades from a desire to be generous, although the motivation may be
commendable, the action will be a misguided application of this motive, i.e., a failure of practical
wisdom. Virtue, for Aristotle, is not only a matter of being disposed to aim at the mean but also
to succeed in hitting it.34 Just as a truly generous person will not give someone something that
will end up harming him—where one who is generous and practically wise will have a reliably
accurate sense of when this will be the case—it is not actual generosity to inflate students’
grades since this denies them a chance to learn from mistakes, in addition to consequences such
as greater emotional distress from future failure. Moreover, grade inflation is unjust on
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Aristotle’s conception of justice as people receiving no more and no less than they deserve.35
This applies both to grades themselves and, especially, to benefits that grades can lead to such as
scholarships, admission to good schools, jobs, etc. Not only is giving students a merit-based
benefit they have not earned unjust on Aristotle’s conception, it is unjust towards others such as
the other applicants over whom the students with inflated grades now have an advantage.36
Since Aristotle characterizes justice as “the highest of all virtues” and “complete virtue and
excellence in the fullest sense”,37 and since grade inflation counts as unjust, it will count as
unethical on Aristotelian virtue ethical grounds even before considering the virtue of honesty.
Thus, virtue ethical approaches influenced by Aristotle—including those that posit vocational or
professional virtues such as Alasdair MacIntyre’s, Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking’s, and David
Carr’s38—will consider grade inflation unethical. While beyond the scope of this paper to
explore in more depth, virtues specific to educators will include honesty, justice, temperance,
courage, etc., specifically as related to educational practice.39 Moreover, good educators will be
disposed to uphold the integrity of the practice itself, which grade inflation damages by
promoting disengagement, fostering values that undermine the aims of education, and disposing
students to be less able to acknowledge and learn from failure, less likely to value education for
its own sake, and less likely to want to develop themselves beyond what they already know and
can do.

Three Potential Objections
I have argued that grade inflation counts as wrong according to the currently most prominent
ethical theories. Three potential challenges, however, remain to be considered: first, from the
perspective of care ethics, another ethical theory distinct from, and arguably not reducible to, the
three considered; second, an argument in favour of grade inflation from the perspective of
rational choice theory that fits broadly within an act consequentialist framework, and third, a
concern that combines elements of the first two challenges.

Grade Inflation as Caring?
Care ethics is currently influential among pedagogical theorists and philosophers of
education. As with virtue ethics, the focus is placed on the sort of person one is rather than on
rules for action. As Virginia Held puts it, “[c]aring, empathy, feeling with others, being sensitive
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to each others’ feelings, all may be better guides to what morality requires in actual contexts than
may abstract rules of reason, or rational calculation.”40 According to James Rachels, care ethics
“begins with a conception of moral life as a network of relationships with specific other people,
and it sees ‘living well’ as caring for those people, attending to their needs, and keeping faith
with them.”41 Since caring educators will want their students to do well, and will aim to nurture
and provide for them pedagogically, it might be thought that giving passing grades for ‘effort’
and generally avoiding assigning low grades that will be perceived as ‘bad’ will be justified by
care ethics. Many teachers who think grading leniency is justifiable may assume this, thinking it
encourages students, promotes self-esteem, and rewards effort. It also may be thought that giving
high grades is a way to help make students’ future lives better, especially students from
underprivileged communities or historically disadvantaged groups, and so is a form of nurture
and support.
These justifications for grade inflation, while well intended, are mistaken. Genuine care and
support focuses on others’ long-term interests rather than short-term preferences or temporary
pleasures; just as caring parents will not ‘spoil’ their children and will have the courage to stick
to ‘tough love’ when in their children’s best interests (if not their preferences), genuinely caring
educators will give students honest critical feedback so they can improve and will find other
ways to mitigate any disappointment or self-doubt, since giving a low grade is sometimes
practically necessary in order to communicate such feedback effectively. Likewise, caring
educators will not want to contribute to students’ future emotional distress when an inflated
sense of ability collapses due to failure, even if it means helping students learn to deal with a
lesser degree of emotional distress in the present. Teachers are not often in a position to follow
their students’ long-term progress, which allows them to think they have helped students based
on short-term results when they do not see the difficulties, disappointment, and distress their
students run into later when it becomes apparent that they are not as capable as they have been
lead to believe by ‘lenient’ grades.
Furthermore, the idea that giving high grades is a reward or benefit assumes grades to be
‘goods’ in themselves—either positive (rewards) or negative (punishments)—that can be
separated from, and so are contingently related to, the abilities and achievements they
supposedly report. This misconstrues the purpose of grading, assuming the same perspective as
the ‘grade oriented’ focus of students who see earning grades, and not the learning or
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achievement to which grades are meant to correspond, as the primary goal of education. While
grades certainly can be motivational, this cannot be their main function lest the activities and
processes involved in learning become subordinated as mere means to the end of ‘scoring
points.’ It is worth considering Alasdair MacIntyre’s example of a child motivated to learn chess
by being promised candy just for playing, and more if he wins. The candy here is an external
good contingently related to chess-playing, whereas the goods internal to that practice include
“the achievement of a certain highly particular kind of analytical skill, strategic imagination and
competitive intensity,” etc.42 As MacIntyre notes, if candy is the goal, the child will have no
reason not to cheat, whereas if the goal is “trying to excel in whatever way the game of chess
demands...if the child cheats, he or she will be defeating not [the opponent], but himself or
herself.”43
The main goal of teaching someone to play chess, and the ‘proper’ motivation to have for
playing it, is to realize these internal goods and not merely to give or receive candy. Similarly,
genuinely caring educators will want students to value and pursue, and come to attain and even
excel in, the ‘goods’ internal to that subject or skill. Inflating grades not only does not lead to
this, but presents an obstacle to it for the reasons given above. Since awarding high grades not
earned through actual achievement does not truly ‘provide for’ or ‘nurture’ students, and does
not lead to their long-term well-being but sets them up for future disappointment and distress, the
idea that grade inflation is ‘leniency’ or ‘generosity’, and that this is a form of caring for one’s
students, is mistaken.

Grade Inflation as Institutional Self-Interest?
A second challenge comes from Raphael Boleslavsky and Christopher Cotton,44 who argue
that schools should encourage grade inflation because it is in a school’s financial and
reputational interest for as many of its graduates as possible to get placed in top graduate
programs or get good jobs. High grades are needed for this, since students will be competing
with graduates from other schools who may have had their grades inflated, and inflating grades
themselves can serve the above aim at no financial cost. They also argue that policies
encouraging grade inflation will lead to an improved quality of education since institutions will
want to preserve their reputations with graduate schools and employers by having graduates
capable of meeting the expectations accompanying their high GPAs.
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The claim that better learning will follow from institution-wide grade inflation seems
backwards and psychologically implausible, given evidence suggesting that being given high
grades without earning them decreases motivation to learn.45 Moreover, if schools can do
something to increase the quality of learning so their students live up to their high grades, why
not do this in the first place and let earned high grades follow? What the authors also fail to
acknowledge is that just because a particular course of action is the most expedient or costeffective means to an end does not entail that it ought, morally, to be done. It is not naive to
insist that the ethical wrongness of an expedient means counts against it when there are other
possible means of reaching this end that are not themselves ethically wrong; being ethical
involves sometimes taking the more difficult path. In effect, what the authors advocate promotes
furthering an unsustainable practice for short-term gains. Their argument fails to count against
grade inflation being ethically wrong, or to show that teachers or institutions have a good allthings-considered reason to inflate grades in response to problems caused by grade inflation
itself.

Grade Inflation as Preventing Injustice?
Part of Boleslavsky and Cotton’s argument points to a more serious challenge: assuming that
grade inflation is prevalent, teachers who do not inflate grades might do students a disservice by
making them less able to compete for social and economic benefits with students whose grades
are inflated. I take this objection to be the most serious, since it speaks to both care ethics and
act-consequentialist concerns, holds some weight for virtue ethical approaches, and could be
considered a situation where a Rossian prima facie duty of honesty might be overridden by a
duty to prevent injustice. It is unjust for some students to have an unmerited advantage over
others, and if one can do something to prevent injustice, it might seem not only caring but what
one ought to do, provided the means by which one prevents the injustice are not themselves more
unjust.
Compassionate teachers will feel torn when faced with the possibility that assigning an honest
grade could hold a student back from future pursuits, but inflating grades only perpetuates the
problem in a way analogous to an arms race between countries. Arms races, whether literal or
metaphorical, are notoriously unsustainable in the long run and so will count as wrong on a rule
consequentialist approach, and on any deontic theory involving some version of Kant’s
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universalizability test. Furthermore, apart from the fact that it perpetuates the problem and
contributes to injustices against others, two assumptions implicit in the objection are worth
analyzing.
The first is that students with non-inflated grades will be at an unfair or unjust disadvantage
compared to students with inflated grades. However, while it would be unjust for a student who
did not merit some benefit to get this benefit due to grade inflation over a student who does merit
it, it is not clearly unjust or unfair for a student whose grades are not the highest to be passed
over in favour of someone with higher grades, whether inflated or not, so long as there are at
least some candidates who are more deserving than the student in question. If a student truly
deserves a merit-based benefit, she will already have earned the highest grades among the
contenders, before inflation. The objection only works if it is assumed that no other contender
will have earned, on their own merit, higher grades than one’s own student would earn honestly,
but the chance of this is so small as to make the assumption unwarranted.
The second assumption is that ‘doing well’ in education is not a matter of learning but of
gaining benefits that learning can result in, and hence confuses the goods internal to education,
which educators are professionally responsible for promoting, with external goods. An ethical
educator will, of course, want students to have positive well-being, and will want to help make
this possible; however, their professional responsibility is centered on their students’ learning
and development, where the student ‘doing well’ in the sense of attaining material goods falls
outside the scope of their responsibilities qua educators. Just as cheating or acting unjustly for
the benefit of friends or family is unethical, dishonesty in grading is unethical when done to give
students a greater chance at a life with material benefits.

Conclusion
I have proposed that if an action counts as ethically wrong on the criteria of most or all
philosophically respectable normative ethical theories, it should be accepted, prima facie and
fallibly, as ethically wrong simpliciter, and I have argued that grade inflation—understood as an
educator evaluating a student’s work as better than it actually is—counts as ethically wrong on
the criteria of deontic, consequentialist, and virtue ethical theories. Since these represent the most
prominent theories in contemporary normative ethics, it follows that grade inflation is prima
facie ethically wrong. That is, it just is ethically wrong unless all three of these ethical theories
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can be shown to be mistaken or inferior to some other ethical theory on which grade inflation, so
defined, is justifiable. I have considered a possible objection from care ethics as one such
alternate theory and have argued that this objection is mistaken. Since this objection fails, along
with those considered in Section 6, then, in the absence of any other plausible normative ethical
theory on which grade inflation would not count as wrong, I conclude that it is ethically wrong.
If this is right, it reveals grade inflation to be an as-yet unrecognized form of academic
dishonesty on the part of teachers—one that should be treated as seriously as plagiarism is for
students, given its potential to undermine the social and personal benefits that are tied to the
intrinsic values of education.
The question remains: given its ethical wrongness, what can teachers do in a context in which
grade inflation is encouraged due to implicit or explicit pressures from students or
administrators, and in which not inflating grades might have negative consequences for their
students or for their careers?
David Blum’s46 proposals to reduce grade inflation include more standardized rubrics,
separating evaluative and teaching roles, and a move to pass/fail grading. However, while these
might encourage consistency among different teachers’ grades within a department or institution,
they fail to address the problem at the level of individual grading decisions, since they do not
prevent whoever evaluates students from misrepresenting their work as better than it is. Blum’s
suggestion that students’ teaching evaluations not be used for hiring, promotion and tenure is
more promising, since it would remove a strong incentive to inflate grades. While teachers are
not themselves positioned to make this change they can advocate for it, perhaps citing studies
showing that teaching evaluations are also flawed insofar as they fail to measure effectiveness in
promoting learning and are likely prone to gender and racial bias,47 and so should be eliminated
for additional reasons.
If the wrongness of grade inflation is not simply having a high number of good grades but the
dishonesty involved in producing them, educators can do more to teach students how to do what
is expected of them in the course, and not only teach ‘content’, which will make it more likely
that more students will do well and so legitimately earn higher grades. While it is beyond the
scope of this paper to offer multiple suggestions, one idea in this spirit is for assignments to be
structured so that the process of completing the assignment itself teaches students how to do it
well. With an essay, for instance, one can make the steps in the writing process—formulating a
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question or thesis statement, writing an outline, reviewing another student’s draft, etc.—each
worth a small part of the grade, or be ungraded but required in order for the final essay to be
accepted, where it is crucial that each step be accompanied by detailed feedback on what can be
improved going forward. There is no guarantee, of course, that this will result in significantly
high grades, and it will work only if students do try to improve based on the feedback at each
stage, but as long as requirements and expectations are explained clearly, grade-oriented students
who do not (yet) value learning for its own sake may take it seriously and come to value learning
itself once they experience how effort can lead to an improvement in both quality and grades.
Whether or not this particular suggestion is employed, it is one way to teach students to be
better at completing the kinds of work required in a course without this taking away from inclass time. While giving feedback at each stage will be time-consuming, taking this time to teach
students how to achieve at higher levels is in line with a pedagogical responsibility to promote
students’ development as thinkers, knowers, and learners. Moreover, since it will likely lead to
higher grades being earned honestly, or at least will better illustrate for students how grades are
earned and not merely given, it is likely to achieve the same end as grade inflation—i.e., more
higher grades, happier students, etc.—while creating the opportunity for students to value
learning and achievement intrinsically. Of course, this is contingent on teachers having the
courage to give low, and even failing, grades when doing so is an honest reflection of the quality
of the work concerned.48
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